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This article begins with some common or well-known sentiments about the present pandemic era
and our experience of it, and moves by way of these toward discussion of the concepts of human
existence and the “world” in the broadest sense of both terms. Departing from but also radicalizing
the notion that “everything changed” in this pandemic time, I discuss certain logical difficulties
that pertain to conceiving of or coherently talking about strict totalities which would include our
own selves. This will have significant consequences for our conception of the world (when taken
in its absolute or broadest sense), and in what sense there are or could be multiple such immersive
wholes of experience. Ultimately, I will suggest that in being able to name such pervasive or allencompassing phenomena, phenomena which are “always more” than what it is possible for us to
indicate, that human existence is fundamentally liminal, or essentially between and borderline.
Being essential or fundamental, this liminality or betweenness will form the basis which precedes
and makes possible the apparently simple activities of, for instance, counting time or comparing
and contrasting ordinary things, activities which would otherwise seem to require no outside support or conditions.

莊子

1

My view is in outline consistent with
Sheehan’s, and is in essence that Heidegger’s work is
“solely and exclusively about meaningfulness and its
source” (Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm
Shift, 10; cf. xii). One must understand the counterintuitive sense meaning has here, however. In introducing Being and Time, Heidegger states that his inquiry,
namely “the question of being,” aims “at an a priori
condition of the possibility of the sciences, which investigate beings as this or that kind of being and
which thus always already move within an understanding of being, but also at the condition of the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them” (Being and Time, 10). The always already here is key, and shifts our frame of reference toward the limits of time, toward a certain “a

priori perfect” temporality (ibid., 85). While it is neither possible nor my intention to attend to
Heidegger’s body of work in any depth here, I will
stress, as he does ad nauseam, that he really intends
to investigate what is always already in view, including in the context of scientific activity. This runs
counter to efforts to see Heidegger as providing a
kind of generalized sociological or psychological
framework for understanding the ways that individuals come to perceive or behave in particular ways, as
he says his inquiry precedes exactly these kinds of
activities. This would be an example of the narrow
conception of psychology (his own would presumably treat this as a study of the “soul” in a comprehensively encompassing sense) Heidegger means to criticize, in which the “I” is taken as “the empirical subject” and “the possible subject matter of theoretical

observation in psychology” (“Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 26).

2

Discussing the relationship between
Heidegger’s thought and the recent pandemic, Aho
portrays Heidegger’s concept of world in terms of the
social scientific concept of “a context of socio-historical meanings,” or “situations where things already
count and matter in particular ways” (“The Uncanny
in the Time of Pandemics,” 7). One is “in” these particular ways or worlds insofar as one happens to be
socialized in a certain culture, and will accordingly

have certain expectations and routines. Cole also portrays Heidegger’s topic as one of worldview, or
“what matters to an individual or community” (193),
and Wasser speaks of “each individual’s field of possibilities” in terms of a range of options available
based on the (dynamic) influence of one’s context
(358). While I disagree with these interpretations, if
Heidegger does indeed mean this, then we would still
need to account for the overall situation of distinction-making that I address in this essay.

3

Accordingly, it would be the context within
which it is possible to measure out the length of
Agamben’s “state of exception, to which governments have habituated us for some time” (“Giorgio
Agamben on health scare and the religion of science,” 3). In the context of my present issue, the state
of exception he has discussed in connection with the
recent pandemic (although he makes clear here that it
preexisted that crisis) would “govern” our “condition” insofar as the exceptional state refuses to be a
state at all, or confounds definition. A state which is
constitutively or essentially exceptional (as it were,
the state of exception as such) would include its outside and thereby confound definition.

4

See Heidegger’s discussion of peras as a specifically constitutive “limit,” not as an “outer boundary” but rather as “that by which and in which something begins and is” (“On the Essence and Concept of
Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I,” 205-6).
5
Grasping this definitive aspect of existence,
namely the irreducibility of the eternal aspect we see
among the sequence of “nows” or moments in their
limitless extent (the “always”), would in my view be
the appropriately radical sense of Heidegger’s call for
“human beings to become [. . .] mortals,” which
Dastur interprets as “ceasing to give in to the illusions of immortality and com[ing] to truly inhabit
and take care of the Earth” (842).

6

Compare this with Heidegger’s characterization of “grounding [Gründen],” because of its rootedness in transcendence, as being “strewn into manifold ways” and forming a threefold complex of
meanings (“On the Essence of Ground,” 127). Transcendence is a being beyond . . . or outside . . . , or in
other words “itself” a relation, so it appears in multiple concurrent aspects.
7
In a separate work on the ways Heidegger’s
concepts pertain to the pandemic experience, Aho
discusses how residents in elder care homes’ “horizon[s] of familiarity collapsed” due to the general
disruptions in routine brought about by confinement
measures. Already out of sorts in these environments,
“the lockdown measures enflamed this disorienting
experience” (“‘We’re Protecting Them to death’—A

Heideggerian interpretation of loneliness among
older adults in long term care facilities during
COVID-19,” 9). In the context I treat here, a “horizon” (which I term as limit, world, or border) would
collapse in and of itself, given that it is an essentially
incoherent or self-disrupting concept. It is for this
reason “closed” or inaccessible in the sense that “it”
could not possibly appear; it stands as its own withdrawal from possible encounter. While Aho suggests
that a collapsed horizon leads to one’s seeing the
world as a hostile and unfamiliar place, being capable
of seeing something in terms of something (for instance this shadowy figure as something which might
cause me pain) means that one is capable of seeing
and specifying what things are, even if one portrays
them inaccurately.
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One might compare this evasion or confounding of interiority with Foucault’s remarks on absence
and exteriority in the work of Blanchot, at least if a
statement like the following is taken literally or radically: “The outside cannot offer itself as a positive
presence — as something inwardly illuminated by the
certainty of its own existence — but only as an absence that pulls as far away from itself as possible,
receding into the sign it makes to draw one toward it
(as though it were possible to reach it)” (Maurice
Blanchot: The Thought from Outside, 28). For this to
remain relevant to the same theme I am developing
here, however, I would emphasize that the “fictional”
character of the images of the outside must be approached as something like a pure fiction or image,
where the image stands as constitutively “unreal” insofar as it manifests pure reference, relation, or indication (which are all ironic figures expressing a confounding or sullying of the self-identical concept of
the “pure such and such”). That is, the outside or sign
per se would, in itself, point outside itself—would be
this pointing away toward . . . an elsewhere which
“it” also is—in relating to . . . itself, where the

relevant “self” is the interstice or relation. The selfundermining character of the sign, its pulling away, is
just the playing-out of the essentially relational sign
“in itself,” apart from its reference to a stabilizing
presence or, to use some language from the cited passage, a something that is ontologically certain of its
own existence. It is, or consists in and plays out, the
very recessionary or regressive movement which
would conduct thought toward this identity-confounding exteriority. I cannot delve further into the
specifics of how exteriority functions in either Foucault or Blanchot’s corpus, but stress that each is a
particular representative of a broad movement—a
movement which, it must be noted, reaches back into
the classical period of not only European but also, for
example, Chinese thought (see, for instance, the limit
paradoxes explored in the Gongsun Longzi’s 公孫龍
子 “Zhiwulun 指物論” or “Discourse on Pointing
Things Out” and Zhuangzi’s 莊子 “Qiwulun 齊物論”
or “Discourse on Evening Things Out” chapters)—
responding to the problem of how to conceive of the
limits, and therefore the outside, of linguistic indication or sense.

9

Cf. Heidegger’s statement that possibility
“grows in its possibility” out of “restriction,” that is,

out of a pure limitation (The Fundamental Concepts
of Metaphysics, 363).

